INTRODUCTION
As the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed, the "freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution." 1 Not only is the freedom to travel a basic right of American law, but the "[c]onstitutional right to interstate travel is virtually unqualifi ed." 2 A recent and sustained marketing campaign by low-cost carrier Southwest Airlines -"You are now free to move about the country" -underscores the liberty to air travel that Americans enjoy. Wealthier Americans were the primary passengers of early airlines. Modern deregulated air travel is more democratic and accessible. Today, anybody, from anywhere, can fly commercially. This freedom has been complicated by the national trauma caused by the events of Sept. 11, 2001, however. Sept. 11 changed the paradigm of commercial airline security. As stated by a former strategy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Karber, 2001 (Karber, -2002 , "the survival of the plane and its occupants is no longer the ultimate objective in a situation involving assailants attempting to seize control of the aircraft." Whatever the novelty of the tactics of Sept. 11, the societal effects of Sept. 11 are anything but novel. The legacy of Sept. 11 is a campaign to determine and isolate "them" from "us." Ironically, in the course of rooting out the proverbial enemy among us, the federal government's investigative energies are directed internally to "us."
Any efforts by the federal government to bolster national security presents a fundamental tension in American society between the practical need for security and the societal promise of liberty (AuBuchon, 1999; Dowley, 2002; Haas, 2004) . Some Americans receive anti-terrorism measures as necessary to protect not just their freedoms, but their very lives. Other Americans resist well-intentioned federal efforts to promote security at the expense of personal freedoms. These Americans charge that hard-won constitutional protections must not be dismissed too easily as abstractions or legal niceties even, or especially, in the face of tangible threats by anti-democracy regimes. As a result of Sept. 11, the modern forum of this historic debate is the national commercial aviation system. Specifically, on (Warren and Brandeis 1890) relative to the post-Sept. 11 ultimatum of former American Airlines Chairman and CEO Robert L. Crandall (2002) : "You want to travel on the airline system? You give up your privacy. You don't want to give up your privacy? Don't fly.
Your privacy isn't equal to the safety of the rest of us."
by Timothy M. Ravich computerized profi ling system called "Secure Flight." Scheduled to launch in the summer of 2005, Secure Flight will empower the federal government to assess the security risk(s) of domestic (not international) airline passengers. Under Secure Flight, airlines are obligated to furnish the TSA with passenger name records (PNR) for each of their respective customers. PNRs may include basic information such as a traveler's itinerary, reservation history, and credit card data along with service-related information such as whether a traveler requested a special meal (e.g., kosher) and/or whether the traveler is traveling alone or with any companion(s). The TSA will compare PNR data with other governmental watch lists, including a "no-fly" list, to develop a passenger profi le.
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A remarkable profi le will prompt the TSA to identify a traveler as a "selectee" for secondary security screening. Profi ling of this nature invites debate of constitutional proportion.
Profiling system critics voice three principal concerns about Secure Flight. First, privacy advocates and civil libertarians contend that profi ling systems such as Secure Flight are extreme. Would-be terrorists with grandiose Sept. 11-like intentions constitute a discrete minority of the traveling population. Accordingly, Secure Flight will not be the least intrusive security alternative because it will intrude into the privacy of the overwhelming majority of airline passengers, namely benign millions of law-abiding citizens who pose no aviation security threat. Second, profi ling systems arguably deprive travelers of control over their personal information. In constructing a passenger profi le and threat assessment, the federal government refuses to disclose precisely what information it will rely upon. Only the government knows the source of profi ling data, which some profi ling system critics argue may include information contained in untrustworthy commercial databases having nothing to do with airline travel. Further, it is unclear how the TSA will avoid and/or remedy profi ling errors caused by mistaken identity, identity theft, fraud, or otherwise. Finally, intentionally or not, profiling systems may promote an unconstitutional categorization of travelers into ethnic, racial, and/or religious groupings. Instead of accepting the presumption that everyone is an equal security risk, airline passenger profi ling systems may cater to a post-Sept. 11 prejudice against certain types of travelers, in particular passengers from the Middle East (von RochowLeuschner, 2004) . For many profi ling system critics, the government cannot be trusted to design egalitarian machinery that is so disciplined as to be blind to the fact that all of the Sept. 11 terrorists were of a related and distinct ethnic, geo-cultural, and/or religious background (Baker, 2002; Banks, 2004; Chandrasekhar, 2003; Derbyshire, 2001; McDonald, 2002) .
In the final analysis, the Secure Flight initiative supposes that the events of Sept. 11 could have been prevented or at least contested. This article accepts that premise and supports the federal effort to pre-screen airline passengers more thoroughly. In doing so, this article surveys and does not dismiss important countervailing constitutional and practical considerations to profiling. Last, this article offers some recommendations on how TSA policy should evolve to account for these concerns while advancing efforts to preempt terrorist plots involving the United States commercial airline system.
WHO IS THE ENEMY?
The initial questions borne of Sept. 11 were "what happened?" and "who did this?" These questions are resolved (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004). The secondary inquiry of what, if anything, can be done to identify and preempt future perpetrators remains open. To answer this question, federal aviation security policy makers assume that terrorists have identifiable characteristics or behavioral patterns that are different from other airline passengers. Profi ling systems are sensible in this context because they distinguish "them" from "us" and "good" from "bad," collecting as much information as possible about terrorists who maneuver among otherwise law-abiding airline passengers. Profi ling systems such as Secure Flight, however, generate serious and divergent commentary challenging why "good" Americans themselves must be investigated as if they are a part of a terrorist threat.
The effectiveness of a profiling system intended to secure Americans and their rights may require some contradictory impingement of the Constitution itself. The end of secure commercial airplane flight may necessitate undesirable means, particularly the abridgment of certain rights if only in the short term. It is not unreasonable or unwise to extrapolate from what is known. Future terrorists may be similar to those involved on Sept. 11. Therefore, profi ling in terms of ethnicity, political agenda, race and/ or religious affi liation has utility (Derbyshire, 2001; McDonald, 2002) . Any federal systematic consideration of these attributes to enforce domestic airline security, however, is anathema to the Constitution and its corresponding freedom to travel (Baker, 2002; Banks, 2004; Chandrasekhar, 2003; Reser, 1998) . Aviation security policy makers also must imagine threats from so-far unrevealed sources. The TSA must forecast that future terrorists are outside the Sept. 11 terrorist profi le. Consequently, every airline passenger poses potential danger. The practice of the federal government targeting a substantial subset of its population (i.e., airline passengers), however, also is antithetical to the ideals of both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Thus, the paramount questions about profi ling systems are whether and how it is possible for the federal government to balance airline security measures with constitutional privacy considerations. The answers are as polarized as these questions suggest.
Profiling systems such as Secure Flight promote a zero-tolerance philosophy that the government should do whatever is necessary to prevent a Sept. 11-like event from occurring. The U.S. Constitution requires more balance and moderation. Secure Flight must be a proportional reaction to the terrorism of Sept. 11 and must perform within the confi nes of the Constitution.
One way to assess whether a profiling system is constitutionally acceptable is to examine the magnitude of operational errors that invariably may occur. The anecdotal evidence of unnecessary interrogations triggered by existing profi ling systems is discouraging in this context. For example, an airline passenger from Kentucky was stopped 22 different times by the TSA, FBI, and Secret Service because his name is the same as that of an apparent fi nancier of Al Qaeda. This experience, compounded by the evolving danger of identity theft, emphasizes actual perils of computerized profi ling systems. Errors occur, but are not always remedied effectively. The U.S. General Accounting Office specifically determined that the TSA failed to address issues of database accuracy, operational safeguards to protect system abuse, security measures to protect unauthorized system access, and passenger redress (U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, 2004). Standing alone, these issues are important. These issues do not exist in a vacuum, however, but instead are relative to and tempered by the fact that the predecessor screening system to Secure Flight successfully identifi ed nine of the 19 Sept. 11 terrorists. It is another matter that the only consequence of identifi cation was detention of the terrorists' baggage until the terrorists themselves boarded the doomed airplanes. The developing story of Secure Flight, therefore, is about a struggle to determine an acceptable level of personal and societal costs brought by new security regimes (AuBuchon, 1999; Kite, 2004; Miller, 2003; Rhee, 2000; Rosenzweig, 2004; Spencer, 2002) .
HISTORY OF AIRLINE PASSENGER PROFILING
The degree to which federal aviation policies reasonably interfere with personal rights, if at all, is measured against the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution specifi cally is the interface of the competing, but similarly esteemed, ideals of national security and personal privacy. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affi rmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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There is little practicality in obtaining a search warrant for every airline passenger who passes through an airport terminal. Consequently, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence fi nds curious application in the context of airline and airport security. For example, boarding gate searches via metal detectors called magnetometers are courtsanctioned procedures that proportionally and defensibly intrude on personal liberty in favor of public safety and welfare. As one U.S. Court of Appeals reasoned:
. . . the search for the sole purpose of discovering weapons and preventing air piracy, and not for the purpose of discovering weapons and precriminal events, fully justifi ed the minimal invasion of personal privacy by magnetometer. The use of the device, unlike frisking, cannot possibly be "an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience, . . ." Searching airline passengers by profi ling may be different, however, and so has received different treatment. Unlike magnetometers, airline passenger profi ling intends to discover indicia of precriminal events that would expose selected travelers to further examination. Whatever its legality, airline passenger profi ling is not new, fi nding precedent in earlier federal security measures designed to prevent air piracy.
Terrorism has tempered the freedom to travel throughout the history of commercial aviation (Reser, 1998) . For example, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has long regulated passenger profi ling. The FAA mandated passenger profi ling as a fundamental part of airline security in the 1960s, an active period of commercial aircraft hijackings. The FAA's "Anti-Air Hijack Profi le" established approximately 25 characteristics empirically linked with those of past hijackers. 6 The purpose of this passenger screening system was to identify personal attributes that, if possessed by a traveler, would entitle security operators to examine that traveler's carry-on luggage by X-ray or otherwise. The FAA ultimately abandoned hijacker-related profi ling in 1972 in favor of global security checkpoints and X-rays of all carry-on luggage. The threat of hijackings and terror, however, did not abate and the need for profi ling systems regenerated years later.
On July 17, 1996, the need for passenger screening reemerged, catalyzed by the disaster of TWA Flight 800. A trans-Atlantic Boeing 747, TWA Flight 800 exploded while climbing over the coast of New York. The disaster occurred because of a defective fuel tank. Survivors suspected terrorism as the cause-in-fact. On this mistaken suspicion, on August 22, 1996, President Bill Clinton directed the development of the "White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security" (Gore Commission). The Gore Commission was charged with "develop[ing] and recommend [ing] to the President a strategy designed to improve aviation safety and security, both domestically and internationally." 7 On Feb. 17, 1997, the Gore Commission issued its fi nal report, making several security-related recommendations among which was the reintroduction of passenger profi ling (Hahn 1997) . The Gore Commission identifi ed three ways in which to improve and promote 1960s-era passenger profi ling:
First, FBI, CIA, and [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] should evaluate and expand the research into known terrorists, hijackers, and bombers needed to develop the best possible profi ling system. They should keep in mind that such a profi le would be most useful to the airlines if it could be matched against automated passenger information which the airlines maintain. Second, the FBI and CIA should develop a system that would allow important intelligence information on known or suspected terrorists to be used in passenger profiling without compromising the integrity of the intelligence or its sources. Third, the Commission will establish an advisory board on civil liberties questions that arise from the development and use of profiling systems (White House Commission, 1997). From this, the FAA advanced its efforts to develop a computer-assisted passenger screening program, the precursor to Secure Flight.
CAPPS I
The fi rst-generation computer airline passenger profi ling system was developed by Northwest Airlines in 1996 under a grant from the FAA. After testing a prototype, Northwest Airlines released the profiling software to other airlines through the FAA in December, 1997. The profi ling software operated through the internal computer reservation system of each airline. Known as the "Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System" (CAPPS), this initial system effected the concept that data collection is power (Nehf, 2003; Solove, 2002) . CAPPS collects approximately 39 pieces of pre-boarding data that, both on a random and an intentional basis, identify travelers who should be subjected to heightened security procedures. Significantly, to the distress of privacy advocates, CAPPS profiles are confi dential (Nojeim, 1998; Rosenzweig, 2004; Smith, 1998) . The confi dentiality of CAPPS profi ling criteria underscores the ever-present tension between national security pressures and constitutional guarantees (AuBuchon, 1999; Crandall, 2002; Kearns, 1999; Smith, 1998) . As one commentator (Rhee, 2000) noted, "[m]aking profi les public is necessary to make them legal, however, doing so would also destroy their usefulness."
While the government will not disclose any criterion upon which a CAPPS profi le is constructed, certain elements of the system are known with some confi dence. Some observers of airline security (Nojeim, 1998) believe that CAPPS tracks several aspects of passenger conduct:
• method of payment for an airline ticket (i.e., cash or credit); • the timing of a purchase (i.e., immediately before departure or in advance); • the identity of travelers, including with whom, if anybody, the passenger is traveling; • the activity at the destination, including whether the passenger intends to rent a car; • the flight itinerary, including where the flight originates and its ultimate destination; • the passenger's specific travel plans, including ultimate destination when different than the flight upon which the traveler is aboard; and • whether the flight is round trip or oneway. A traveler identifi ed by CAPPS as a "selectee" is subject to secondary screening:
Depending on the destination of the passenger (domestic or foreign) and the availability of advanced technology at particular airports, the additional security measure applied to selectees typically will involve one of the following: bag matching (the requirement that checked luggage be flown only if it is determined that the passenger who checked the luggage has boarded the airplane); examination by a certifi ed explosive detection system (EDS); or examination using other advanced technology (such as explosive detection device or a trace detector) (U.S. Department of Justice 1997).
Curiously, this security regime likely would not have prevented the fi rst documented bombing of a commercial airliner in the United States. That event occurred in 1955 when a passenger's son covertly packed a bomb in the passenger's luggage to collect insurance policy proceeds Smith, 1998) . The unsuspecting passenger boarded the fateful flight without drawing any additional security screening. The effectiveness of profi ling systems in the possible circumstance that innocent passengers are manipulated for sinister purposes is dubious.
Therefore, profiling invites significant criticism along operational grounds. CAPPS critics contend that the methodology used to profi le airline passengers for further screening is over-inclusive, flagging up to half of all passengers yet missing vital targets (Rosenzweig, 2004) . Profi ling system opponents also contend that such systems simply do not work. For example, profi ling by the U.S. Customs Service has not stopped the drug trade (Nojeim, 1998) . In 1999, the FAA responded to this and other criticism by limiting the use of CAPPS profi les to baggage screening, abandoning the practice of subjecting selectees to personal searches and questioning. Concerns remained, however, about whose baggage was searched and why.
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) (2001) 
Ibid.). Ibid
In 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reviewed the selection criteria in CAPPS and opined that CAPPS did not "discriminate unlawfully against passengers" or include passenger traits such as names or mode of dress that might be directly associated with race, ethnicity, or religion (U.S. Department of Justice 1997). The DOJ concluded that CAPPS would not have a "disparate impact on any group of passengers" (Ibid passengers" (Ibid passengers" ( ). Profi ling system opponents, Ibid). Profi ling system opponents, Ibid however, found the Gore Commission's stated goals specious and the DOJ's conclusions unbelievable.
The chief criticism of CAPPS -a criticism leveled with equal force against forthcoming profi ling systems -relates to the confi dentiality of the data relied upon to construct passenger profiles. Profiling system critics protest the lack of transparency of CAPPS data as well as the source, integrity, and potential for misuse of such information. Some CAPPS opponents specifi cally warn about the dissemination of CAPPS profi les to other governmental agencies for purposes unrelated to terrorism or aviation security. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argues:
By its very nature, the computerized profi ling system runs afoul of a central principle of privacy: Information given for one purpose ought not to be used for other purposes without the consent of the person to whom it pertains. People book a flight, or enroll in a frequent flyer program, not because they want to yield up data about themselves for a massive profi ling system, but because they want to travel, and occasionally, travel for free. The computerized profiling system relies on the wealth of data airlines collect about passengers for reasons other than profiling. Information airlines collect about their passengers includes name, address, the destinations to which a passenger flies with a particular airline, how the passenger paid for their tickets and who may have purchased the tickets for the passenger, the people with whom the passenger has traveled, whether the passenger booked onward travel such as a car or hotel, and other information. This personal data needs to be protected (Nojeim, 1998) . To protect airline passenger privacy without a corresponding decline in aviation security, the ACLU imagines security measures alternative to profi ling, including training security personnel to identify tangible evidence of suspected criminal activity on reasonable, articulable bases other than stereotypes; screening airline personnel and employees of air security vendors (within constitutional means); adding measures to enforce security standards at foreign airports; and limiting FBI and law-enforcement access to passenger records except pursuant to a court order based on probable cause of criminality (Ibid). After Sept. 11, however, aviation security policy makers moved to enhance CAPPS capabilities.
CAPPS II
Described by senior government offi cials as the single most important component of the nation's aviation security infrastructure (O'Harrow, Washington Post, August 27, 2004), CAPPS II was a post-Sept. 11 proposal to update CAPPS I. CAPPS II intended to authenticate the identity of commercial airline passengers by checking each traveler's PNR, including full name, home address, telephone number and date of birth, against governmental databases for security assessment. CAPPS II would bridge airline passenger profi ling systems to law enforcement and intelligence databases. As one publication reports (CMP TechWeb, Sept. 3, 2004) , "CAPPS II would have notifi ed law-enforcement offi cials whenever the screening process turned up passengers with outstanding warrants against them, even for non-travel-related incidents." As important, CAPPS II would use commercial databases for counterterrorism purposes. The use of commercial databases would enable aviation security analysts to create a mosaic of information derived from a variety of sources (Kearns, 1999) . These aggressive features, if implemented, would make more potent the federal government's anti-terrorism efforts, which failed on Sept. 11. CAPPS II advocates understood the proposed system to be both a necessary overhaul of existing aviation security measures and an appropriately calibrated defensive measure. This rationale, however, met spirited opposition (DeGrave, 2004; von Rochow-Leuschner, 2004) .
CAPPS II critics protested forcefully that, even acknowledging the magnitude of the terrorism of Sept. 11, CAPPS II would blunt Constitutional privacy rights to an intolerable degree. In an article on the expansiveness of CAPPS II (Wald and Schwartz, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, Sept. 20, 2004) , several reporters relate a concern about "mission creep," whereby information comprising an airline passenger profi le would unacceptably slip bit-by-bit into the hands of non-TSA governmental actors for uses unrelated to aviation security. Additionally, CAPPS II critics repeated their criticism of CAPPS I that the constitutional costs to liberty and privacy rights outweighed imagined or actual benefi ts of profi ling systems. CAPPS II opponents also publicized several embarrassing failures of CAPPS I. In September, 2004, British pop star Cat Stevens, who became a Muslim in the 1970s and today is known as Yusuf Islam, was evicted from an international flight bound for the United States. Stevens' name was on the government's "no-fly" list. CAPPS I also identifi ed U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and U.S. Representative Don Young (R-Alaska) for extra security scrutiny. The deepest criticism respecting CAPPS II related to the system's proposed use of commercial data for law-enforcement purposes. As two commentators noted:
For example, if you do not buy the book Amazon.com recommended to you based on other customers' buying patterns, the negative consequences are slight. If your credit card company puts a hold on the use of your card because it noticed an odd usage pattern and suspected someone might have stolen your card, you can explain and continue to use your card. But the consequences of using data for counterterrorism purposes can be much more serious. They can include arrest, deportation, loss of a job, greater scrutiny at various screening gates, investigation or surveillance, or being added to a watch list (Dempsey and Flint, 2004) . Eventually the crescendo of criticism by CAPPS II opponents reached the TSA, which offered to make several system modifi cations.
The TSA suggested three significant amendments to the CAPPS II design. First, the TSA agreed to erase most passenger information in the CAPPS II system within a certain amount of days after passengers completed their scheduled travel. The TSA also proposed appellate mechanisms for passengers erroneously targeted for heightened, secondary security screening. Most important, the TSA proposed limiting the use of private commercial data to compose a traveler's security profi le. In particular, the TSA proposed transmitting PNR information to commercial data providers solely for the purpose of authenticating a passenger's identity. Commercial data-miners, in turn, would evaluate whether a passenger is, in fact, who s/he represented when reserving a flight. Upon completion of this authentication process, the CAPPS II system would review a passenger's commercial identity against intelligence and law enforcement databases. Passengers positively identifi ed without any corresponding matches with intelligence or law enforcement data would proceed to their flights. Those passengers with more remarkable profi les would be subjected to further search and/or law enforcement action. CAPPS II opponents viewed these measures as insuffi cient and CAPPS II never materialized.
CAPPS II was a marketing disaster apart from its substantive controversy. By proceeding without notice or opportunity for meaningful public comment, the TSA did precisely what privacy advocates cautioned CAPPS II would do -deny citizens due process of the law. The private method in which CAPPS II developed aggravated privacy-related concerns that the federal government was undercutting the Constitution. This suspicion evolved into certainty when civil libertarians learned that some airlines assisted the government to develop CAPPS II. JetBlue Airways and Northwest Airlines voluntarily provided the TSA with lists of their respective passengers for testing in the CAPPS II system, hoping to secure the very airplane travel they sell. JetBlue Airways, for instance, provided a data-mining government contractor with approximately a million passenger records (including names, addresses, and phone numbers). A consumerresearch company ultimately evaluated these records, which included information about each passenger's demographics, including occupation, income, gender, home-ownership and car-ownership history, and household composition. This transfer of information was effected without the knowledge or consent of the passengers whose identity was disclosed. The airlines were sued as a result.
8 The industrygovernment collaboration of the CAPPS II program highlighted the depth of information available by marrying PNR data with commercial and law-enforcement databases. The industrygovernment collaboration of the CAPPS II program also emboldened profiling system opponents. Ultimately, the TSA abandoned CAPPS II on July 13, 2004, after the U.S. General Accounting Offi ce reported that the TSA failed to meet related privacy concerns (U.S. General Accounting Offi ce 2004).
SECURE FLIGHT
In August, 2004, the TSA introduced "Secure Flight," a next-generation CAPPS. Secure Flight is designed to implement the recommendation that government "no-fly" and "automatic selectee" lists be improved through a terrorist screening database (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). As one airline industry observer noted (AlonsoZaldivar, Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2004), "[a]bout 15% of the nearly two million domestic air travelers each day are now pulled aside for more intrusive searches." "One of the goals of Secure Flight will be to bring down the rate of passengers selected for secondary screening . . . while effectively catching known or suspected terrorists" (Kim, Aviation Daily, Sept. 22, 2004) . Secure Flight will be built upon the technology platform of its controversial predecessor, CAPPS II. The technical similarity between CAPPS II and Secure Flight encourages the contention that Secure Flight is, as one privacy advocate suggests (Scannell, USA Today, September 28, 2004) , nothing other than "a stripped-down version of the old CAPPS II system with a more consumer-friendly name."
The TSA promotes Secure Flight as different from predecessor profi ling systems, however. Secure Flight purportedly will access commercial databases only to confi rm the actual identity of a traveler and not to compute a risk score for purposes divorced from commercial aviation security. Additionally, the TSA proposes that Secure Flight will maintain an appellate process for travelers mistakenly or inequitably selected for secondary screening. Finally, the TSA proposes employing a passenger advocate to whom passengers could turn if they are unfairly flagged for heightened security treatment. Whether these features alleviate the concerns of privacy advocates and civil libertarians is still at issue (Kite, 2004) .
Like CAPPS II, Secure Flight represents ongoing efforts by the executive branch of the federal government to involve itself directly with aviation security after Sept. 11 (Hessick 2002 (Hessick -2003 . Secure Flight will shift passenger prescreening responsibilities from the privatized airlines to the federal government. 9 Currently, airlines compare passenger names with government-provided terrorist watch lists. Certain sensitive government watch list information, however, is not available to airlines. To close this intelligence gap, Secure Flight will unify the process of comparing passenger identifi cation with government data by having the government alone make this comparison relative to the government's own watch lists, including the Terrorist Screening Center Database (TSCD). In November, 2004, the TSA began testing Secure Flight by collecting historical passenger information and comparing that information with commercial data to determine the accuracy of passenger information and to resolve false positive matches against TSCD records. Therefore, privacy advocates contend that Secure Flight may be more invasive than CAPPS II. Accordingly, Secure Flight generates the variety of constitutionally-based opposition that defeated the CAPPS II program. Through a request under the Freedom of Information Act, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a Washington, D.C. based public interest group, demanded that the TSA produce documents that explained how or if the FBI intends to protect the privacy of travelers in the course of maintaining records in terroristscreening databases. EPIC's specifi c critique is that profi ling systems such as Secure Flight deny airline passengers any judicially enforceable rights. EPIC charges that:
Like its [CAPPS] predecessor, Secure Flight has been exempted from crucial provisions of the Privacy Act, which will severely limit the rights individuals typically would have in the personal information the government maintains about them. For instance, Secure Flight may collect and use personal information irrelevant and unnecessary for aviation security. Furthermore, passengers will have no judicially enforceable rights to access and correct the personal (Hilkevitch, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 22, 2004) , one reporter writes that "CAPPS II . . . required the airlines to turn over only passenger names, dates of birth, home addresses and home telephone numbers . . . [whereas] Secure Flight mandates that the airlines provide the security agency with passenger name records for each traveler --a document that contains 39 fi elds of information ranging from a passenger's history of selecting pre-reserved seats to the identity of traveling companions." Another source (Wald, International Herald Tribune, Sept. 23, 2004) elaborates that the data the TSA requested "varies from airline to airline . . . and may also include the names of others traveling in the same party, meal preference, whether the reservation was changed, the method of payment and comments of all types by airline employees on matters like whether a passenger was drunk or belligerent." With this data, the TSA expects to conclude Secure Flight testing in February, 2005 , and, in March, 2005 , the Government Accountability Offi ce is expected to report to Congress on the TSA's plan to examine commercial data through Secure Flight.
CONCLUSION
The issue of passenger profi ling transcends the narrow topic of aviation security. Secure Flight and its predecessor profi ling systems animate a philosophical tension in American society, disrupting the theoretical constitutional fault-line of liberty and order. Americans equate liberty and privacy with a right to avoid the public gaze and to be let alone (Warren and Brandeis 1890) . Democratic and utilitarian impulses, meanwhile, encourage individual sacrifi ce for the greater good, e.g., national security. Whether national security and privacy are equivalent concerns is debatable.
The relative importance of personal liberty and societal security is contextual. While the federal government is stimulated to preempt terrorism, the urgency that motivates Secure Flight dissipates over time as Americans normalize their lives and return to routines after Sept. 11 (Daniel, 2001 . Today, increasingly, Americans greet successively intrusive national security measures by the federal government with an "anti-anti-terrorism" sentiment that is based upon concerns about an ever-expanding executive and a "fear of technology" (Rosenzweig, 2004) . Some citizens "equate the potential for abuse of Executive Branch authority with the existence of actual abuse," considering "any expansion of executive authority, notwithstanding the potential for benign and benefi cial results, because they judge the potential for the abuse of power to outweigh the benefi ts gained" (Ibid the benefi ts gained" (Ibid the benefi ts gained" ( ). The TSA's promise to Ibid). The TSA's promise to Ibid remedy profi ling system mistakes after-the-fact is no promise for many Americans. For privacy advocates and civil libertarians, the idea of federal government access to airline passengers' personal commercial data is problematic in the first instance. As one DOT official said (Podberesky, 2004) , "many on the outside feel that the government cannot monitor its own activities." The interplay of liberty and order is so delicate and fundamental that, whatever the events of Sept. 11, it is diffi cult to envision an adaptation of Secure Flight or similar airline passenger profi ling system that harmonizes these two ideals.
The events of Sept. 11 mandate better security-related intelligence, however. Intelligence services should gather and share more information to effectuate this end (Kreimer, 2004) . Secure Flight is consistent with this objective. Information networking vis-à-vis airline passenger profi ling is a clear, limited, context-specifi c societal objective that, in a post-Sept. 11 environment, legitimately rivals private interests. As one scholar notes (Nehf, 2003) , to best protect privacy rights generally, "in the modern digital world, information privacy should be viewed as a societal value justifying a resolution in the public interest, much like environmental policy and other societal concerns, with less emphasis on individual self-policing and market-based mechanisms." As to Secure Flight specifi cally, the TSA must do more to publicize the merits of its proposed profi ling system so that citizens have confi dence in it and their rights relative to it. To date, however, Secure Flight develops at a distance from airline passengers, through technical legal papers, narrow communication channels, and uninviting bureaucracy. The TSA should engage American citizens to participate in national security programs actively.
In place of paternalism, the TSA might create a collaborative approach to national aviation security. This can be done if the TSA provides tangible travel-related benefits in exchange for voluntary sacrifi ce on the traveler's part. As part of any aviation security campaign, the federal government might look more closely at the recommendations of private actors in the commercial aviation industry. For example, the Air Transport Association supports expansion of the government's "Registered Traveler" program, which is being tested at airports in Boston, Houston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Washington, D.C. Registered Traveler invites participants to submit to a background check voluntarily and to provide security agents with their birth date, phone number, address, and a biometric identifi er (e.g., fi ngerprint or iris scan). In return, registered airline passengers may avoid checkpoints and/or extra screening. Passengers who do not want to give up their privacy need not fly commercially (Crandall, 2002) .
In the final analysis, the TSA's proposed profi ling system divides Americans philosophically. This is evidenced (Air Safety philosophically. This is evidenced (Air Safety philosophically. This is evidenced ( Week, October 11, 2004) Within this debate, the U.S. government has made a defi nite choice, allowing national security concerns to overtake privacy interests by some measure. Of course, citizens must not abandon a corresponding right and duty to protect, protest, and effectuate change to the extent constitutional conceptions of privacy and civil liberties are impinged. Airline passenger profi ling systems do not purport to be panaceas for securityrelated vulnerabilities of the commercial airline industry. Instead, they are but one, vital element in a coordinated defense against tangible threats to American lives. The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law under the Fifth Amendment . . . In Anglo-Saxon law that right was emerging at least as early as the Magna Carta . . . Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be necessary for a livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values. [One author has said,] "Our nation [ ] has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases." 357 U. S. 116, 126 (1958) . Article 42 of the Magna Carta reads:
It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water, saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who shall be treated as it is said above.
3. The government's "no-fly" list identifi es known or suspected terrorists while its "watch" list names those identifi ed for tighter pre-boarding scrutiny. Cir. 1971 ) ("To require a search warrant as a prerequisite to the use of a magnetometer would exalt form over substance . . . The danger is so well known, the governmental interest so overwhelming, and the invasion of privacy so minimal, that the warrant is excused by the exigent national circumstances.").
6. In United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 , 1183 (3d Cir. 1972 ), a federal appellate court concluded:
The practicalities of commercial air transportation dictate that any attempts to discover potential hijackers among scheduled passengers be carried out with minimum disruption of the boarding procedures. The Profi le meets in part this objective by immediately restricting application of the intrusive aspects of the program. Its compilation of easily observable, nondiscriminatory indicia characteristic of the hijacking problem focuses the program on a limited number of persons among each group of boarding passengers. We cannot conclude that solely because the Profi le operates on the basis of a statistical comparison of the passengers to past hijackers that, necessarily, it should be considered as an attempt to establish probable cause and, therefore, be subject to scrutiny according to 4th Amendment standards.
7. Executive Order 13,015, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (1996) . 9. The government has federalized the aviation security infrastructure since Sept. 11, 2001 . In addition to creating the Department of Homeland Security (of which the Transportation Security Administration is a part), in November, 2001, the federal government assumed responsibility for screening airline passengers, a task historically managed privately by airlines through independent contractors. As a result, today, all airport security screeners are federal employees.
10. Air Safety Week, "Reactions to Secure Flight," Oct. 4, 2004. 11. Air Safety Week, "All for It -and Completely Opposed," Oct. 11, 2004. 
